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Thispaperdiscussesthepoliticsofaccesstoessentialmedicinesandidentiﬁes‘space’inthecurrentsystemwhere
health concerns can be strengthened relative to trade. This issue is addressed from a global governance perspec-
tive focusing on the main actors who can have the greatest impact. These include developing country coalitions
and citizens in developed countries though participation in civil society organisations. These actors have com-
bined forces to tackle this issue successfully, resulting in the 2001 Doha Declaration on Public Health. The col-
laboration has been so powerful due to the assistance of the media as well as the decision to compromise with
pharmaceutical companies and their host countries. To improve access to essential medicines, six C’s are needed:
coalitions, civil society, citizenship, compromise, communication and collaboration.
Access to Essential Medicines:
The Debate
Patents are often viewed as a technical issue, one to be
discussed and contested by intellectual property lawyers
whoarefamiliarwiththecomplexlanguageusedindraft-
ing agreements and briefs. However, as the past 10 years
have shown, patents are actually a critical health issue
and, as Pogge (2007) has argued, an important moral
issue of our time. The agreements made at the global
level within the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and
in bilateral trade negotiations have enormous local im-
plications, especially among the global poor.
In this paper, I discuss the politics of access to essen-
tial medicines and identify ‘space’ in the current system
wherechangecanbemade.Iwouldliketostartbystating
theobviousproblem:thecurrentstateofaccesstoessen-
tial medicines among the global poor is unacceptable.
Every year there are over 18 million preventable deaths
and tens of millions more cases of increased morbidity
due to poverty-related causes and arguably the unavail-
ability of essential medicines. Why in a world of plenty
do we still have so much suffering? This leads us to a
moral question: what are our moral duties to those who
aresufferingfrompreventableandtreatableillnessesdue
to the unavailability of pharmaceuticals, or, when they
do exist, a lack of access to them? The current situation
constitutes a violation of the human rights of millions of
the world’s poorest people.
At a global level, there is a systematic weakness of
healthconcernsrelativetotradeandtensionsbetweenthe
governance of trade and health (Lee et al., 2008). For ex-
ample,humanrightsandhealthactivistshavearguedthat
patent protection prevents access to essential medicines,
resulting in unnecessary, excessive and unjust mortality
and morbidity. However, this argument has been dis-
missed by pharmaceutical industry representatives and
their host countries, who have argued that patent pro-
tection, such as that afforded by the WTO Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS),1 is necessary to incentivize research and thus
save lives in the long term. In terms of patent protection
barring access to drugs, they point to research such as
Attaran’s (2004) article, which argues thatpatent protec-
tion for AIDS medications has little effect on the distri-
bution of drugs, to argue that it is other factors in devel-
oping countries that result in limited access to essential
medicines.
The patent regime notwithstanding, there are struc-
tural and wider societal factors in developing countries
that impede access to medicines. Morbidity and mor-
tality are often the result of underlying social inequal-
ity, poverty, gender inequality, caste/class discrimination
and lack of access to clean water and adequate sanitary
facilities. Thus there is an argument to be made for
paying attention to the forces that produce and aggra-
vate the social conditions that impede access to essential
medicines.Indeed,thislineofargumenthasbeenusedby
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pharmaceuticalcompanies,lobbyistsandtheUSgovern-
ment to stall action on generic drug production and up-
hold patent protection, such as that afforded by TRIPS.
Thereisnoquestionthatstructuralfactorsareimpor-
tant. Most developing countries do need better health
systems and infrastructure, more health workers, clean
waterandpropersanitationandbetterinstitutions.They
do need equitable economic growth, job creation and
poverty reduction. Few would question this. But the im-
portanceofthesefactorsdoesnotreducethesigniﬁcance
of the barriers to access to essential medicines at reason-
ablepricesthatarecreatedthroughpatentlaws.Thefocus
on structural factors in developing countries is often an
excuse for the lack of progress in trade negotiations. In
addition, when access to essential medicines is blocked
by two barriers (patent protection and structural factors
in developing countries), we cannot absolve one of re-
sponsibilityonthebasisthattheotherexists.Thiswould
provide perverse incentives for those who would block
attemptstoaddressstructuralfactorstoensurethatthere
isasecondbarriertopatentprotectionalsoinplace.And
it would provide no moral incentives to remove either
barrier (as each is innocent of the harm they together
produce).
Barrierstoimprovingaccesstoessentialmedicinesex-
istatdifferentlevels,includingresearchononehandand
productionandpricingontheother.Intermsofresearch,
Pogge (2007) has proposed a complementary patent ar-
rangement called the Health Impact Fund (HIF), which
focuses on incentivizing pharmaceutical companies to
develop drugs for diseases that predominantly afﬂict the
poor. As Ravvin (2008) notes, ‘Under this plan, instead
of receiving proﬁts from selling patented drugs at high
monopoly prices, innovators could opt to register any
newlypatentedmedicinewiththeHIF,whichwouldpro-
vide a guaranteed payment stream in proportion to the
incremental impact of the innovative drug on the global
burden of disease (GBD) during its ﬁrst 10–12 years on
the market.’ I return to this proposal later in this paper.
In terms of pricing and production, I will focus on the
roominthecurrentsystemforhealthconcernstobepri-
oritised.Thisissueisaddressedfromaglobalgovernance
perspective focusing on the main actors who can make a
difference. These include developing country coalitions
and citizens in developed countries.
The Role of Developing Countries
Iturnnowtoexaminetheimportantrolethatdeveloping
countries can play in the prioritisation of health relative
to trade concerns. It is ﬁrst important to understand the
inner workings of the WTO. As Patel (2007) describes,
despite the existence of a voting structure, WTO deci-
sions are reached through ‘consensus’ within restricted
inner-group meetings, known as ‘Green Room’ meet-
ings. Historically, the four members included in these
meetings were USA, Japan, the EU and Canada. Because
of this informal and exclusive governance arrangement,
the WTO has been criticised for its lack of transparency
and marginalisation ofdeveloping country concerns. An
example of this marginalisation is TRIPS, where organ-
ised and coordinated intellectual property stakeholders,
mostsigniﬁcantlylargepharmaceuticalcompanies,came
together to press for certain conditions such as stringent
intellectual property rights in all countries regardless
of their state of development. (It should be noted that
private interests are of course informally represented at
WTOnegotiations;ofﬁcially,negotiationsareconducted
among states.)
Why did developing countries, which had the most to
lose,agreetoTRIPS?Somehaveexplainedtheagreement
ofdevelopingcountriestoTRIPSbypointingtotheelites
thatgovernthem,whodonotalwaysrepresenttheneeds
of the poorest citizens. While I recognize the validity of
this argument in some cases, I argue that government
should nonetheless be the key actor in development if
itslegitimacyisderivedfromdemocracyandanelectoral
process.ThusItaketheperspectivethatdevelopingcoun-
trygovernmentswithdemocraticlegitimacyshouldhave
the authority and capacity to represent their countries’
interestsintradenegotiations,andshouldbeabletodoso
on fair terms with wealthy countries. In brief, ownership
and control of trade negotiations by developing coun-
try governments are important for three distinct rea-
sons:effectivenessandsustainability,democracyandself-
determination and the alignment of accountability with
effectiveness(suchthatthosewhomakethekeydecisions
also bear the risk if policies have detrimental effects).
Pogge (2007) offers an alternative explanation. He
argues that most poor countries lacked the bargaining
power to resist the conditions of TRIPS that were im-
posed by rich countries. This situation raises the ques-
tion of how relatively weak developing countries can ne-
gotiateonafairbasiswiththepowerful,developedstates
withintheWTO.Usingapolitical-economicperspective,
we can choose a country that has achieved a certain level
of success in pharmaceutical trade negotiations, such as
India, and try to understand what factors facilitated the
process. Drawing on interviews with Indian government
ofﬁcialsinvolvedinthenegotiations,Iidentifyfourmain
factors: ﬁnancial independence from wealthier states, a
clear plan, strong leadership and technical expertise in
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Countries that enter trade negotiations without these
four elements face a signiﬁcant disadvantage. This can
be overcome through developing countries organising
and forming a coalition and pushing forward their col-
lective agenda. Developing country coalitions have built
and used coalitions to improve their bargaining power.3
As Patel (2007) describes, this pooling of bargaining re-
sources has improved the technical and lobbying capac-
ity by which developing countries engage in the WTO.
These coalitions are highly visible, formalized and co-
ordinated and focus on working within the WTO and
existing trading structures to proactively engage in the
negotiation process with the purpose of improving out-
comes for developing countries.
Patel (2007) outlines three beneﬁts of developing
country coalitions. First, countries can share the costs
of negotiating in the WTO. Developed countries have
many negotiators based in Geneva, while developing
countries have much fewer. For example, Carolyn Deere
has noted that the USA, Canada, Japan, and the EU have
roughly two Geneva negotiators per 10 million citizens
while developing countries have just one. These num-
b e r sd on o tc a p t u r et h ef a c tt h a tm a n yo ft h ed e l e g a t e s
from developing countries are also responsible for cov-
ering other international organisations that are based in
Geneva (e.g. World Intellectual Property Organisation,
International Labour Organisation). Second, coalitions
enable collaboration among countries so that they are
able to compensate for their individual capacity limita-
tions by sharing the tasks of technical and legal analysis.
Third, coalitions can increase representation of develop-
ingcountries.In2004,33developingcountriesthatwere
WTO membershad nopermanent representatives tothe
WTO based in Geneva, and so were unable to be present
atanumberoftradenegotiations.Morenegotiationscan
bemonitoredwhenformaldelegatesareelectedtorepre-
sent groups of developing countries (e.g. African Group;
African, Caribbean and Paciﬁc Group of States (ACP);
Least Developed Countries Group (LDC)).
I would add a fourth beneﬁt of developing country
coalitions. By aligning with emerging countries such as
China, India and Brazil, less powerful countries can bet-
terhandlethebullyingtacticsofcertaindevelopedstates.
Iwouldliketoelaborateontheﬁnalpoint,asitiscritical
to understanding the implementation of TRIPS. While
most parties involved have seen TRIPS as a maximum
standardofcompliance,theUSAhasvieweditasamini-
mum. The USA has used its power to enforce TRIPS and
bully countries into complying. Beyond this, the USA
has used bilateral free trade agreements to extend the
reach of TRIPS and increase patent protection beyond
theprovisionsofTRIPS;theseagreementsarereferredto
as TRIPS-plus. Caroline Thomas (2002: 255) quotes an
NGO staff member in Washington, DC:
The problem for developing countries is not
whether the compulsory licensing of pharmaceu-
ticals is legal, because it clearly is legal. It is the
political problem of whether they will face sanc-
tions from the U.S. government, for doing things
that they have a legal right to do, but which the
U.S. government does not like.
Similarly, Ralph Nader and James Love have spoken
about the ‘weight of the US power, short of military
warfare, on South Africa to prevent that country from
implementing policies to obtain cheaper sources of es-
sential medicines’ (cited in Thomas, 2002: 256). For ex-
ample, in 1997 and 1998, Thailand, in the face of the
HIV/AIDS crisis, attempted to use TRIPS articles 30 and
31 to pursue compulsory licensing of generic medicines.
However, Thailand dropped these plans when threat-
ened with sanctions by US trade ofﬁcials (supported by
the lobbying organisation PhRMA, the Pharmaceutical
Research and Manufacturers of America).
The Role of Citizenship
The other main group of actors, citizens in developed
countries, are especially important in light of the atti-
tudes that developed countries take towards trade nego-
tiations and enforcing trade agreements. The main
multilateral trade institution, the WTO, consists of
member-states. The government of each state, at least
the democratic ones (which also happen to include the
developed countries), are accountable to their citizens.
Thus, those of us living in the wealthier countries have
considerable inﬂuence over our governments’ decisions
and are therefore to a certain extent responsible for its
actions, regardless of whether they take place in a multi-
lateral forum or through bilateral agreements.
How can an individual inﬂuence his or her govern-
ment’stradepolicy?Citizenscanorganiseandformcon-
sumer groups, such as Knowledge Ecology International
run by James Love, or join and ﬁnancially support civil
societyorganisations(CSOs)advocatingforaccesstoes-
sential medicines. Citizens can write to their senators,
representatives, or members of Parliament arguing why
a change in foreign policy is necessary. Perhaps most ef-
fectively,citizenscanmakehealthandhumanrightsakey
electoralissueandapplypressureduringpresidentialand
senatorial campaigns. The upcoming 2008 US presiden-
tialelectionprovidesanopportunityforcitizenstolobby
for access toessentialmedicines as candidates attempt to
avoid bad press.86 • SRIDHAR
Doha Declaration on TRIPS
and Public Health
Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health
Developingcountriesandcitizensindevelopedcountries
represented by CSOs working together can increase the
voice and interests of those most in need of affordable
medicines. This was demonstrated in November 2001
whentheWTOadoptedtheDohaDeclarationonTRIPS
and Public Health. In this agreement, a coalition of de-
veloping countries sought explicit assurance that they
would not be subject to WTO penalties under TRIPS for
addressing certain health crises by issuing compulsory
licensesandextendingfor10yearsthedeadlinebywhich
least developed members must provide patent protec-
tion for pharmaceuticals (Odell and Sell, 2006). How
werethedevelopingcountriesabletoachievethisdespite
thepowerfuloppositionfrompharmaceuticalcompanies
and their host countries?
Four key factors can be identiﬁed (Odell and Sell,
2006). First, intellectual property was framed as a public
health issue about saving lives by civil society organi-
sations, which captured the attention of mass media in
industrialised countries. CSOs, such as MSF (M´ edecins
Sans Fronti` eres), TAC (Treatment Action Campaign),
ACT UP Paris, Oxfam GB and Health Action Interna-
tional, pushed the issue to the forefront, indicating the
role that these organisations and networks can play in
supporting the agenda of developing countries and lob-
bying on their behalf. In addition, citizens lobbied their
governments and gained the attention of prominent of-
ﬁcials. During the 2000 US elections, when Al Gore an-
nounced he was running for president, health activists
interruptedhisspeechchanting‘Gore’sGreedKills.’The
media picked up this story, and then the White House
reached out to activists and started discussions.
Second,thedevelopingcountrycoalitiondidnotfrag-
ment and pursued a common objective in WTO negoti-
ations. Even in the face of US concessions to the African
Group in the hope that it would withdraw, the coalition
stayed together. Third, the coalition was large, including
the African Group, Brazil, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh,
Indonesia, Thailand, SriLanka, Philippines and11 other
LatinAmericanandCaribbeanstates,andthuscouldnot
be easily dismissed. The inclusion of Brazil was impor-
tant as the country was already a leader in the generic
production of antiretrovirals and could play a key rolein
the negotiations. Fourth, the coalition eventually made
a compromise and went after what was achievable given
theexistingtradingstructures,notwhatwasideal.While
perhapsimperfectfromanidealmoralperspective,com-
promisewasarguablynecessarytoachieveagreementon
the Declaration, which was highly preferable to no Dec-
laration at all. One can see these four factors as forcing
the pharmaceutical manufacturers and their home gov-
ernments to compromise and agree to the Declaration.
Mixed News Since 2001
Despite the general disappoint with the patchy imple-
mentation of the 2001 Declaration (Love, 2006), there
has been some positive news from individual developing
countries on the prioritisation of health. For example,
Thailand and India have become strong examples for
what can be achieved for other developing countries. In
November 2006 the government of Thailand announced
that it would issue a compulsory license to the Govern-
ment Pharmaceutical Organisation of Thailand so that
the company could produce the AIDS drug efavirenz
(Storcrin), which was still under patent by Merck. Then,
in January 2007, the government of Thailand issued a
compulsory license on patents for clopidogrel bisulfate,
a heart disease drug, as well as compulsory licenses on
patentsontheAIDSdrugsoldbyAbbottunderthename
of Kaletra.
In addition, in 2006, India rejected Novartis’ patent
application for the cancer drug Gleevec. Under Indian
law, patents are only given for medicines invented af-
ter 1995, or for new and more efﬁcacious versions of
older drugs. The law in effect upholds scope for the pro-
duction of generic medicines. India rejected the patent
application because the drug that Novartis wanted to
patent was not more efﬁcacious than older versions. No-
vartis challenged the decision in a court in Chennai as
the company argued that the decision, and the crite-
ria used to make the decision, violated WTO law and
could set a precedent that would make it very difﬁcult
to patent new drugs. In 2007, the court ruled against
Novartis and in favour of Indian law, and more impor-
tantly for those concerned with public health, in favour
of public health interests over intellectual property law.
The Novartis case has set an important precedent. Glax-
oSmithKline recently withdrew patent applications for
itsantiretroviraldrugsAbacavirandTrizivirinIndiadue
to concerns about Novartis’ patent rejection and about
challenges to its patent applications by CSOs MSF and
I-MAK. GlaxoSmithKline thought it better to withdraw
the applications rather than receive a rejection because a
rejectioncouldweakenthecountry’schancesofreceiving
patents in other developing countries.
Pharmaceutical companies have argued that facilitat-
ing compulsory licensing and patent rejection by certain
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in neglected diseases. GlaxoSmithKline states, ‘Use of
compulsory licensing...would signiﬁcantly undermine
the beneﬁts to be gained from patents (which are real)
withouthavingasigniﬁcantbeneﬁcialimpactonaccess.’4
Thesefears,howevervalid,providemorereasontofavour
a systematic solution to this problem, such as that pro-
vided by the Health Impact Fund (Ravvin, 2008).5 The
implementation of this proposal would go some way to-
ward abating fears that compulsory licensing and patent
rejection will decrease the amount of research into ne-
glected diseases.
The Way Forward
Despite the agreement reached on the 2001 Doha Decla-
ration on Public Health, as of the end of 2007, nothing
agreed upon has yet been launched, and USA is increas-
inglyturningtobilateralagreementsoutsidetheWTOin
ordertothwartthepowerofnegotiatingcoalitions.These
bilateral agreements erode the gains made in the 2001
declaration. In addition, the use of bilateral agreements
such as Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) has
resulted in negotiations taking place outside the WTO.
These agreements have been notoriously difﬁcult for the
WTOandCSOstomonitor.Thepoliticsoftradenegotia-
tions have therefore changed to preserve the negotiating
advantages of developed countries through the use of
bilateral agreements that circumvent the WTO.
What is the way forward? To improve access to essen-
tialmedicines,sixC’sareneeded:coalitions,civilsociety,
citizenship,compromise,communicationandcollabora-
tion.Allsixelementscametogetherwhenthe2001Doha
Declarationwasagreedupon.First,developingcountries
must form a coalition that comes together to achieve a
very speciﬁc objective and does not fragment. Second,
CSOs committed to health issues must continue to push
the issue onto the political agenda. Third, citizens in de-
veloped countries need to pressure their governments to
prioritise health concerns through lobbying, protesting
and supporting CSOs. Fourth, the various stakeholders
mustcompromisetoacertainextentsothatprogresscan
bemade.Fifth,healthactivistsmustcommunicatetothe
media, so that the media can frame the issue of access
to essential medicines in an appealing manner. Finally,
developing countries, CSOs and citizens in developed
countries must collaborate to ensure that the barriers to
access to essential medicines are overcome.
Iconcludethispaperbyfocusingontheissueofpower:
who gets what, when and how. As citizens we must think
about what part each of us will play as we move forward
intothetwenty-ﬁrstcentury.Weneedtothinkaboutwho
has power, how they use it and how we, as concerned
actors in our respective roles as academics, practition-
ers, policy-makers, activists and citizens, can ensure that
ourgovernmentsandinternationalinstitutionsfunction
with attention to the moral duty to reduce the obstacles
to access to essential medicines.
Notes
1. FordetailsonTRIPS,seehttp://www.wto.org/english/
thewto e/whatis˙e/tif e/agrm7 e.htm
2. India is of course unique as it has a large population
and economic independence from donor countries.
3. This analysis draws on the important work of Mayur
Patel(2007)aswellasSusanSellandJohnOdell(Odell
and Sell, 2006; Sell, 2002).
4. http://www.iprcommission.org/graphic/Views
articles/GlaxoSmithKline.htm
5. http://www.patent2.org/index.html
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